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THEORIES AND TESTS OF "BLIND BIDDING" IN SEALED BID AUCTIONS 
Robert Forsythe, R. Mark Isaac and Thomas R. Palfrey 
Auctions are a ubiquitous method of allocating resources. While auctions 
share many common characteristics, there are some features which distinguish 
among them. One such difference is the information that the seller and the 
buyers have about the quality of the item(s) at auction. In many cases, the 
seller of the item has better information about the quality of the item than 
any of the potential buyers. If buyers knew this information, they would be 
able to more accurately determine their valuations for the item. While a 
seller may choose to reveal his information to the buyers, it may not always be 
in a seller' s best interest to do so; instead, he may decide to "blind bid" his 
item. In this paper, we will develop several competing predictions regarding 
blind bidding behavior and report the resul ts of an experiment which was 
designed to test these predictions. 
The institution of blind bidding has recently become a matter of 
controversy in the motion picture industry. A distributor of a film conducts 
an auction in which motion picture exhibitors (owners and/or operators of movie 
theater houses) can obtain the rights to exhibit the film. While distributors 
could permit ex�ibitors to screen the film prior to submitting their bids, they 
instead commonly choose to blind bid their product. Since 1977 , however, many 
states have passed laws outlawing the practice of blind bidding. These laws 
have been supported by the exhibitors but have brought heated objections from 
the motion picture industry, including threats to discontinue location filming 
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in states which adopted them. 1 
In what follows, we do not restrict ourselves to the motion picture 
industry specifically since the issues we address are present in any auction 
where a seller may, at his discretion, provide potential buyers with useful 
information about the quality of the item for sale. Nonetheless, our results 
may be of particular significance for the case of the motion picture industry 
since we do present a theoretical and experimental analysis of market 
performance in sealed-bid auctions in which the sellers may optionally blind 
bid the object they have for sale.2 
We consider a model which is a special case of a class of "persuasion 
games" which has been analyzed in Milgrom (1981] and Milgrom and Roberts 
(1986] . In our model, there are several Nash equilibria which may arise� In 
one of them, all items are blind bid since buyers ignore all information 
provided by a seller and the seller offers no information since what he says is 
irrelevant. In another equilibrium, no items are blind bid since buyers adopt 
a skeptical "assume the worst" strategy about a seller' s announcement and thus 
a seller can never do better than to reveal his information to the buyers. If 
we restrict our attention to sequential equilibrium as introduced by Kreps and 
Wilson (1982] , only the second of these two Nash equilibria is also sequential. 
A sequential equilibrium requires each buyer to make conjectures which are 
consistent with a seller' s announcement strategy. Since the Nash equilibrium 
in which the buyer ignores the seller' s announcement requires that each buyer 
1 See Harris [ 1981], Kenney and Klein [ 1983 J ,  and the note in Harvard Law 
Review (1979] . 
2Since completing our experiments, we have become aware of a paper by King 
and Wallin (1986] who consider similar issues in a competitive double auction 
market for risky assets. Their findings seem generally consistent with ours 
although they consider different alternative disclosure rules. 
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disregards a seller' s motives when considering the seller' s announcement, this 
cannot be a sequential equilibrium. 
We also use the sequential equilibrium model of the persuasion game to 
provide some results concerning the way in which an equilibrium is attained. 
As long as at least one buyer adopts an unsophisticated strategy about the 
seller' s announcement and acts as if this information had been provided by a 
disinterested party, a seller wil l  adopt an announcement strategy that 
maximizes the price he receives from the unsophisticated buyer , Since even 
unsophisticated buyers are responsive to favorable information in a sequential 
equilibrium, a seller wil l  reveal his information if it is very favorable and 
will make noninformative announcements otherwise , When the seller does not 
reveal his ·information, an unsophisticated buyer will be the high bidder for 
the item since he will average over all possible quality levels for the item 
instead of assuming the worst. We show that as buyers become increasingly 
sophisticated, a seller reveals his information for units of increasingly lower 
quality levels. In this way, the market behavior will "unravel" to the 
predicted sequential equilibrium. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows , In the next section 
we present our model of a persuasion game and derive testable predictions. In 
section II, we �resent a description of the laboratory markets we conduct along 
with formal statements of the specific hypotheses we wish to test. Our results 
are described in section III and we provide a summary along with some 
concluding remarks in section IV. 
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I ,  The Model 
In this section we borrow heavily from Milgrom and Roberts [ 1986 J. 
Consider a game with a single seller and n buyers, The seller knows the 
quality of the single item he has for sale and he can provide verifiable 
information about the item' s quality to the buyers. For simplicity, we 
consider only the case where the seller must decide whether to announce his 
item' s quality. If he does announce the quality of the item, his announcement 
must be truthful. All buyers receive this information; the seller cannot 
selectively reveal the item' s quality to some, but not all of the buyers. 
After buyers observe the information provided by the seller, the item is 
auctioned off in a first - price sealed bid auction. The seller tries to 
maximize the price he receives for his item, while each buyer wishes to 
maximize his expected profits which are given by his expected valuation for the 
i tern less its purchase price. Each buyer' s expected valuation for the i tern 
depends upon its quality, the information disclosed by the seller, and the 
inferences the buyers make from this disclosure. 
This problem can be represented as an auction in which the object being 
sold has a common value component and a private value component, Specifically, 
we assume that· these components are additive, so that if a buyer wins the 
(first-price) auction with a bid, b; , and the common and private values of the 
object are, respectively, q and vi, then that buyer receives a utility equal to 
Uw (b; ,c,v1) - q + v1 - b1• If the buyer does not win, he receives utility UL -
0. It is common knowledge that the set of possible values of q, denoted Q, is 
finite with possible values 0 < q1 < q2 < , . < q5, where qk_1 - qk - q1 , for 
k - 1, . . .  ,S-1. The probability that a seller is endowed with a partic�lar 
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"quality level" (i. e. common value component) is l/S. Further, for each k, 
each buyer' s private valuation, is independently drawn from a uniform 
distribution on [O, q1 ] .  Consequently, conditional on common quality level qk, 
k buyers' combined common and private valuations (qk + v;) are independently and 
identically distributed on the interval [qk, qk+ll: The initial structure of
k private information is that the seller knows qj and each buyer i knows v;, for 
each k. 
The game proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the seller observes 
the quality, qj, of the object he has for sale and makes a public announcement 
from the set A - (qj' Q) . In other words, the seller either precisely 
reveals the quality or reveals no information at all. After the announcement, 
a sealed-bid first-price auction is conducted. 
To define an equilibrium to this game we specify an announcement strategy 
for the seller, a (•) , which maps Q into A; a belief function for each buyer, 
P; (•) , which maps A into probability distributions on Q; and a bidding strategy 
which maps A x [O, q1 ] into :II+. Because announcements must be truthful,
P; (•Ja-qj) is a degenerate distribution at qj. Thus, we only need to consider 
beliefs in the second stage for the case in which the announcement is Q 
("noninformative"). 
There are several Bayesian Nash equilibria to this game. Two extreme 
versions provide some idea of the range of possibilities, At one extreme is an 
equilibrium supported by what Milgrom and Roberts have called "naively 
credulous" beliefs when the announcement is Q .  A t  this equilibrium, Q is 
always announced and the buyers take this at face value and do not update their 
prior beliefs about q. Thus P; (q8 Ja-Q) - l/S for all s. The strategies of the 
buyers are to bid 0 if any other announcement is made, regardless of their 
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private valuations, and to bid the Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategies for 
the auction with their original priors on q and other buyers' valuations. 
equilibrium bidding function is given by 
* -








where v1 � � v� and F(•) is the distribution function of v1• The first term k=I 
in (1) is the expected quality level, the second term is buyer i' s expected 
private value and the third term is the expected difference between buyer i' s 
valuation and the second highest private valuation conditional on buyer i 
having the highest private valuation. 
At the other extreme is an equilibrium supported by beliefs which "assume 
the worst" when the seller announces Q. At this equilibrium, the seller always 
announces qJ except possibly at j-1. When j-1, the seller is indifferent 
between announcing q1 and announcing Q. Thus, P; (•Ja-Q) is degenerate at q1 . 
The equilibrium bidding function is given by: 
qj + (v;) (n-1)/n (2) 
Between these two extremes, there are numerous other equilibria similar 
to the one where buyers are naively credulous. All of these share the property 
that the seller_ reveals the quality for certain quality levels, but for other 
levels, the seller makes a noninformative announcement. If the seller deviates 
from these equilibrium announcements, the buyers bid 0 for the seller' s item. 
These equilibria all possess the undesirable property that buyers' bids off the 
equilibrium path are not rational. In particular, it is not sequentially 
rational for all buyers to bid 0 after the seller announces the true quality of 
the object. 
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All equilibria, except for the one where buyers asswne the worst, are 
ruled out by the sequential equilibriwn concept introduced by Kreps and Wilson 
[ 1982]. These equilibriwn are ruled out since they are supported by behavior 
off the equilibriwn path which is not sequentially rational. The argument of 
Grossman (1981], Milgrom (1981] and Milgrom and Roberts (1986] for why the only 
sequential equilibriwn involves full disclosure (except possibly at the lowes t 
quality level) goes as follows. If the seller announces Q, the buyer realizes 
that the seller' s item must be of a quality level such that the price he 
receives by making an noninformative announcement when bidders use (1) is 
higher than the price he would receive by revealing the quality of his unit, 
when bidders use (2) . With such reasoning, a buyer assigns zero probability to 
the item being of the highes t quality when the seller' s announcement fs 
uninformative. With these conditional probabilities the amount that a buyer 
will bid in (1) is reduced, and buyers will use a bidding function in which q
in (1) is replace by q' - �q <q q1/(S-l) j s Iteration of this 
argwnent produces an "unravelling" of the nondisclosure equilibrium and 
demons trates that in a sequential equilibriwn beliefs must "assume the worst". 
Therefore, the seller is indifferent between blind bidding or revealing the 
quality of the lowes t quality unit, but strictly prefers to disclose all other 
qualities. 
Summarizing, there are many Bayesian Nash equilibria to this two stage 
bidding game. However, applying standard sequential rationality arguments 
eliminates all but one of these equilibria--the "assume the wors t" equilibriwn. 
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II. Laboratory Markets
A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The results from six experimental markets are reported below. We 
examined the behavior in two different environments which differed in the way 
in which the buyers' valuations were determined. In the first environment, all 
items had common value components only; buyers did not have private values for 
the object . In the second environment, all items had both a common value and a 
private value component. Markets were run using undergraduate s tudents at 
three different locations : Carnegie-Mellon University, the University of 
Arizona and the University of Iowa. Within each environment we conducted three 
markets; one at each of these locations. 
There were eight participants in each market. After the participants 
arrived, four of them were randomly designated as buyers and the other four as 
sellers. The ins tructions, which are reproduced in Appendix 1, were read aloud 
and any questions were answered , Subjects were informed about the rules that 
would govern trade and how their earnings would be determined. Specifically, 
subjects were told that:  1 )  the highest bidder for an item would be awarded 
that item, 2) each buyer would receive a "resale value" for each item purchased 
and a buyer' s profits from purchasing a unit was equal to his resale value 
minus the amount that he had bid, and 3) a seller' s profits from selling a unit 
were equal to the amount the highes t bidder had bid. 
Each market consisted of a number of trading periods. In each period, 
each seller had one unit to offer for sale to the buyers . In the firs t 
environment we examined, all buyers had a common same resale value for an item 
although this value was generally different for different items. In each 
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period and for each item, this common value (in cents) was drawn with 
replacement from the interval [l, 125] where all integers in this interval were 
equally likely. A sequence of random draws was preselected and this sequence 
was used in the markets conducted at all three locations. 
At the beginning of each trading period, each seller was told the common 
resale value of the unit he had for sale in that period. The seller then 
decided whether to reveal this information to the buyers. After all sellers 
had made their decisions, they were publicly announced by the experimenter. If 
the seller chose to reveal his information, the resale value of his unit was 
publicly displayed to all market participants. Next, a first-price sealed bid 
au.ct ion was conducted for each seller ' s  item. Each buyer submitted a separate 
bid for each item. After all bids had been submitted to the experimenter, both 
the winning bidder and his bid were publicly displayed, The losing bids were 
not publicly announced but all bids on a seller ' s  item were given to that 
seller. Any ties were resolved using a random number table. Also, the common 
resale value of all units which the sellers had not revealed were publicly 
announced at the end of each period. 
All buyers were endowed with $5. 00 in "working capital" at the beginning 
of the experiment. This was to compensate for any loss which would result if 
the buyer were to bid in excess of his value and have his bid accepted. While 
no buyer in our markets ever lost money on items whose common resale values 
were revealed by sellers, such losses did arise on items which sellers chose to 
blind bid. Buyers were also paid 25 cents for each period that was conducted. 
The procedures for the second environment we examined were identical to 
the first except that each buyer ' s  valuation for a unit had both a common value 
and private value component. This change was made to increase the equilibrium 
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profits that buyers could earn. In the common value only auctions, the 
equilibrium bidding strategy for buyers requires that they bid the full value 
of a unit whenever the seller announces its quality (see (2) ) .  Thus, an 
"assume the worst" equilibrium is one in which buyers earn zero profits. 
In the second environment, a seller ' s  item was one of eight possible 
"types" where an item ' s  type determined its common value to the buyers. In 
each period, the type of each seller ' s  item was randomly determined, where each 
possible type was equally likely. The previous sequence of resale values was 
rescaled to the interval [l, 120] and the resulting distribution was divided 
into eight disjoint subintervals, each of which had a length of 15 cents. 
Thus, a type I unit had a common value of 1 cent, a type II unit a common value 
of 16 cents, and type III unit ' s  common value was 31 cents, and so forth. - Use 
of this rescaling technique preserved the same pattern of high and low quality 
items as in the three markets of the first environment. Each buyer ' s  private 
valuation was drawn from the interval [ 0, 14 J where all integer's in this 
interval were equally likely. Thus, the range of possible resale values for 
buyers was [l, 15] for a type I unit, (16, 30] for a type II unit, etc. Each 
buyer ' s  valuation for each type of unit was determined by an independent draw 
from the corresponding range of possible resale values for that type. Within 
that range, eac� integer value was equally likely. Thus, given a unit ' s  type, 
buyers generally had different resale values. However, observe that the 
private value uncertainty is quite small compared with the common value 
component. Among other things this means that the last term of the equilibrium 
bidding function in (1) is less than $. OS. Nonetheless, this technique ensures 
that buyers earn strictly positive expected profits in the sequential 
equilibrium. 
1 1  
Each experimental market lasted between two and a half and three hours. 
At the end of the session, each participant was privately paid the amount of 
their earnings. In the discussion that follows in the next session, we will 
adopt the mnemonic "Sn" when referring to a particular market. The code S can 
take on one of three values which identify the site where the market was 
conducted : "A," "C," and "I" refer to the University of Arizona, Carnegie­
Mellon University, and the University of Iowa, respectively. The code n will 
either be a " l" or a "2" to identify the environment which was used. 
B. HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we apply the predictions of section II to the 
environments and parameters we described above. We will examine only two of 
the Bayesian Nash equilibria -- the one in which buyers are naively credulous 
and the sequential equilibrium in which buyers assume the worst. After 
reviewing our results below, it will be apparent that there is no support for 
the other Bayesian Nash equilibria. 
We begin by examining the predictions about which items will be blind 
bid. If buyers are naively credulous, sellers should blind bid all items in 
both environments. Formally this gives us 
HYPOTHESIS 1: In all markets, a-Q for all sellers in all periods. 
Alternatively, if buyers assume the worst, sellers should reveal the 
quality of their object, except, perhaps, when they are endowed with a unit of 
the lowest quality level. Sellers should be indifferent about revealing the 
quality of these lowest quality units. 
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HYPOTHESIS 2: In all markets, a-q1 for all j>l, for all sellers in all
periods. Further ae(q1 , Q) if j-1.
There is also a question about how the sequential equilibrium is 
achieved. As Milgrom and Roberts [1986] point out, in order to reach the 
"assume the worst" equilibrium, every buyer must be sophisticated, that is, 
capable of game-theoretic reasoning. Realistically, it is unlikely that all 
buyers are this sophisticated. It is possible however, that unsophistt,cated 
buyers will not remain unsophisticated indefinitely - - especially in situations 
where they can each observe many replications of a market and can accumulate 
observations from the joint distribution of market data and state of nature. 
Over time, it seems reasonable to expect that unsophisticated traders will 
eventually understand that items of quality levels exceeding some particular 
quality level, say q1, are never sold via a blind bidding auction while items 
which have quality levels less than or equal to q1 are always sold through 
blind bidding. In this way an unsophisticated buyer will gradually adopt 
conditional probability beliefs closer to a sophisticated buyer , Eventual ly, 
in equilibrium, qJ should converge to q1 , and all buyers will adjust their 
beliefs accordingly. Thus, we can imagine the sophisticated equilibrium being 
approached through this unravelling process. The next hypothesis captures this 
idea about the nature of convergence to a sequential equilibrium. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Let q� j� be the minimum quality level which a seller has chosen 
to reveal in periods l, . . .  ,t-1, and let qt be the quality level which the 
seller is endowed with in period t. In all markets, the seller will not blind 
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We next wish to examine the behavior of the selling prices in the 
auctions we conducted. We will not, however, concern ourselves with the prices 
for those items whose seller revealed its quality. The behavior in first price 
private value auctions has been examined extensively by Cox, Roberson and 
Smith [1982] and our data is consistent with their previous findings. In our 
second environment, our private value intervals are far too small to allow us 
to gain any further useful insights on bidding behavior. We will examine the 
price behavior of those items which were blind bid for further insights into 
how these markets equilibrated. 
The unravelling process provides a qualitative prediction about how the 
bids on blind bid items should behave over time. Initially all buyers hold 
naively credulous beliefs, but over time each buyer lowers his expectations 
about the common value of a unit whenever a seller makes a noninformative 
announcement. While we cannot measure buyers' expectations directly, this 
adjustment story has obvious implications about buyers' bidding behavior on 
blind bid objects. Since this is a hypothesis about expectations of the common 
value of a blind bid item, we must adjust the bids in the markets A2, C2, and 
I2 to account �or the private valuations. To do this, we assume that in blind 
bid auctions buyers initially bid according to (1) and these bids decline over 
time. While an exact calculation of (1) is impractical, a close approximation 
(within a few cents) is given by : 
* - I .llill -b; (v; a=Q) = 2S qs + 3v;/4 (l' ) 
for markets 4-6. 
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HYPOTHESIS 4: i Let bJt be the amount bidder i bids in period t on an item j 
which is blind bid. In the common value markets, Al, Cl and Il, 
(S+l) q1/2 and b}t � b}t+l, with strict inequality for some t .  In markets with 
private valuations, A2, C2 and I2, b}1 - (S+l) q1/2 + 3v;/4 and 
bft - 3vi/4 � bft+l - 3vi/4 with strict inequality for some t .
The final two hypotheses address the distributional and efficiency 
effects of blind bidding. First, it is frequently alleged by exhibitors of 
motion pictures that the practice of blind bidding more often than not results 
in losses due to overbidding. In contrast, the theoretical model predicts that 
this should not happen in a sequential equilibrium . Specifically, the model 
predicts: 
HYPOTHESIS 5: In all markets, a buyer never pays more than his resale value, 
q+v1 , on any blind-bid item . 
Finally, we turn our attention to the allocative efficiency of these 
markets. This is of no concern in markets 1-3 where all objects were of common 
value to the buyers. As long as all items are sold (which they were) , any 
allocation is �fficient. In markets 4-6, allocative efficiency requires that 
the buyer with the highest private valuation acquires the item. So that we may 
control for the common value component of each item, we measure the efficiency 
of a market period Iv;!; n/L�ax, where v;! in is the private valuation of the 
winning bidder for item j and �ax is the maximum valuation among all buyers 
for the item j. The sums are taken over the four items which are available for 
sale in a period. Both the models we have examined predict that the allocation 
should be 100% efficient in these markets. This gives: 
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HYPOTHESIS 6: In markets A2, C2 and I2, the average efficiency in each period 
is 100%. 
III. Results 
The time series of transactions for blind bid items in all six of our 
markets are presented in Figures 1-6, respectively. 3 An " X" indicates the 
average common value of blind bid items within each period, while an "0" 
indicates the average of the winning bids on these items. 4 A complete set of 
the common values of all items which were available in each market is displ.ayed 
in Appendix 2. 
A casual examination of these figures reveals an apparent unravelling of 
both the prices paid· for blind bid items and the quality levels of these items. 
In 5 of the 6 markets, the transaction price of blind bid items was at 15 cents 
or less in the final period. The lone exception is Market Cl, where prices of 
blind bid items remained above 30 cents throughout the entire market. As will 
be discussed below, this is due to the bidding of a single buyer. This 
behavior seemecl due in part to the fact that in environment 1 buyers were 
earning at most two cents profit on items whose quality was revealed. To 
overcome this possible incentive problem, we attempted to increase the profit 
3A complete set of data for these markets is given in Appendix 2. 
4 Particular care should be taken when examining the graphs from Markets 
A2, C2 and I2. The excess of the average winning bid over average common value 
is greater than the corresponding difference in the other three markets. This 
apparent discrepancy is due to the private valuations present in Markets A2, C2 
and I2. 
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opportunities for the buyers in environment 2 by incorporating private 
valuations. 
As the foregoing discussion about the unravelling in these markets 
suggests, Hypothesis 1, that all items are blind bid, fares very poorly. As 
can be seen from Table 1 as well as the figures, far less than half of the 
items were blind bid in all six markets. Thus, we reject Hypothesis 1. 
We next examine Hypothesis 2 which states that buyers assume the worst 
and thus, sellers reveal the quality of all units except perhaps those of the 
lowest quality level. The data we used to test this hypothesis is also given 
in Table 1. For markets with private values (Markets A2, C2 and I2) , this 
table gives all of the items which were blind bid which were not units of the 
lowest quality. Since buyers' valuations for the lowest quality units we-re in 
the interval [1,15] , we also excluded units who were valued at fifteen cents or 
less in the markets without private values (Markets Al, Cl and Il) . Using the 
data from all periods of each market, there is little support for Hypothesis 2. 
In the markets with private values, 12. 3% of these items were blind bid; 
similarly, only 26. 3% of all items in markets without private values. 
On the other hand, it has been well-documented (see Plott (1982] and Smith 
(1982] ) that experimental markets do not attain an equilibrium instantaneously; 
instead, they �end to converge. While there is no established convention for 
deciding how to test equilibrium predictions on experimental data, we have 
chosen to examine our data after ten periods have occurred, From the bottom 
two rows of Table 1, it can be seen that the sequential equilibrium prediction 
given in Hypothesis 2 performs quite well after period 10 in five of the six 
markets. In three of these markets, Al, A2, and C2, items with common values 
in excess of 15 cents were never blind bid after period ten. In two of the 
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markets, Il and I2, only three items were blind bid after period ten; in Il 
these three units had a common value of 28 cents or less and each of the three 
units in I2 were of the second lowest quality level (i. e. had a common value of 
16 cents) . The only market where Hypothesis 2 is not supported is C2, where 
29. 2% of all units (14 of 48) were blind bid after period ten although 12 of 
these items were awarded to one bidder who continued to bid in excess of 30 
cents for these items, Consequently, items which had common values of this 
amount or lower were stil l  being blind bid at the conclusion of the auction. 
Nonetheless, the amount being bid for blind- bid items as well as the average 
common value of these items were still declining at the conclusion of the 
auction. Thus, we do not believe that this market is strong evidence against 
Hypothesis 2; instead, we would argue that while the market has not -fully 
unravelled, the unravelling process was continuing (albeit slowly) when the 
market was terminated, 
As a separate point, recall that the sequential equilibrium model also 
predicts that sellers should be indifferent between blind bidding and revealing 
the quality of the lowest quality units. If such were the case, we should see 
approximately an equal amount of revelation and blind bidding on these low 
quality units, Such is not the case, however. Sellers blind bid 27 out of 28 
type 1 units in environment 2 and 19 out of 19 units with a common value of 15 
cents or less in environment 1. Sellers apparently feel they have nothing to 
lose by not revealing a low quality unit as long as they believe there is a 
positive probability (perhaps very small) that some buyer will overbid on that 
unit, 
Since our results indicate that our markets are indeed approaching the 
sequential equilibrium, we next examine Hypothesis 3 about how an equilibrium 
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is achieved in these markets. This hypothesis states that once a seller 
reveals the quality of a particular item, items of higher quality are never 
blind bid by .iill:£ seller in the market. In Table 2, we present a list of 
observations where this hypothesis fails. As can be seen, it never fails in 
markets Al, Il, C2 and I2 and it fails only once in market A2. This l atter 
failure occurs in a very early market period (period 2) . This hypothesis fails 
four times in market Cl, but the same seller is responsible for all of the 
contradictory observations. Thus, there is substantial evidence in support of 
the unravelling hypothesis. 
We next test the implications of the unravelling hypothesis on buyers' 
bidding behavior as stated in Hypothesis 4, Recall that this hypothesis has 
two parts, The first part, which is concerned with the bidding on blind bid 
items in the first period of each market, postulates that buyers are initially 
naively credulous and that they will bid according to (l') . To test this 
hypothesis we compute the difference between each bid on a blind bid item in 
period 1 and the predicted bid as given by (l' ) .  W e  next constructed three 
pooled data sets, Two data sets consisted of the pooled data across all 
markets in the same environment and the third set consisted of the pooled data 
across both environments. We conducted t-tests to test the null hypothesis 
that this difference was zero and, regardless of which pooled data set was 
used, we are able to reject this hypothesis at the . 0001 level. A further 
examination of the data indicates that buyers bid significantly less than 
predicted in the first period. Thus, while they haven ' t  as yet begun to assume 
the worst, they are more skeptical than naively credulous. 
The second part of Hypothesis 4 states that buyers' bids should decline 
monotonically over time as they lower their expectations about the common value 
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of units which are blind bid. To test this hypothesis, we conducted several 
regressions to measure the time trend of prices and bids. In Table 3, the 
results using price as the dependent variable are displayed. In all six 
markets, the null hypothesis that the time trend is zero can be rejected at the 
. 002 level or less when tested against the one-sided alternative that the time 
trend is negative. Thus, winning bids do decline monotonically over time. 
We next tested the individual buyers' bidding behavior to see if it 
exhibited the same monotonicity. Our results are presented in Table 4A for the 
markets in environment 1 and in Table 4B for the environment 2 markets. An 
examination of these tables reveals two distinct kinds of bidding behavior. 
Most of the buyers (79% - 19/24) make bids which decline over time. In 
eighteen of these nineteen cases, the regression coefficient is significant at 
the .OS level. 
The second type of bidding behavior is exhibited by a minority (21% -
5/24) who begin with very skeptical beliefs and discover that these beliefs are 
not justified initially since sellers are blind bidding higher quality levels 
than they had expected. These buyers then increase their bids, at least for a 
while, as they adjust their expectations about the common value of blind bid 
items. As the tables indicate, these buyers also tend to be the winning bidder 
on very few blind bid items since they are more skeptical than others in their 
market. These
-
individuals are characterized by a bidding equation with a 
"small" intercept and a positive slope in Tables 4A and 4B. 
There is one remaining buyer whose behavior is not classifiable under 
either of the two types described above. This is buyer 4 in Market Cl, whose 
bidding behavior exhibits a negative time trend although it is not 
significantly different than zero. This individual received 69% of all blind 
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bid items and seems to have impeded the market from unravelling below the $. 30 
level. 
We next turn our attention to Hypothesis 5 which state that buyers should 
earn non-negative profits on all blind bid items . The percentage of those 
items on which buyers paid more than their resale values are given in Table S .  
These percentages all exceed 40% and, in one case (Market Al) exceeds 90%. 
Buyers are indeed incurring losses on a large proportion of the items which are 
blind bid. 
However, while buyers' average profits on blind-bid items in each auction 
are negative, the null hypothesis that buyers earn non-negative average profits 
can only be rejected for Market Al (and perhaps marginally so for Market G2) . 
As the range of profits on blind-bid items given in Table 5 indicates, buyers' 
frequent losses on blind-bid items are almost offset by occasional large 
positive profits on other blind-bid items. Thus, the standard error of buyers' 
profits was sufficiently large to render. the negative average profits as 
insignificant in most cases. It also follows that since buyers did not incur 
significant losses, the sellers also did not gain from blind bidding items. 
These results suggest that the institution of blind bidding does not lead to 
significant profit gains for either buyers or sellers but, instead, it 
increases the velatility of everyone's profits. 
Finally we examine Hypothesis 6. The efficiency in each period for each 
market is given in Table 6, both using all items and excluding blind bid items. 
As can be seen from the table, all markets were operating at or near 100% 
efficiency during the last several periods prior to their conclusion. These 
efficient allocations were due largely to the sequential equilibrium being 
realized. The majority of misallocations occurred when units were blind bid 
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even though less than 25% of all items were blind bid. The bottom two rows of 
the table show the number of units that were misallocated for units which were 
blind bid and for units whose quality was revealed. Of the 57 units which were 
blind bid, 37 of them (64. 9%) were misallocated. When sellers revealed the 
quality of their units, only 14.4% (27 out of 187) of these units were 
misallocated. Thus, blind bidding decreases the allocative efficiency in these 
markets. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
It is clear that the sequential equilibrium model is a good predictor of 
behavior in these simple markets. The importance of replication and learning 
is also very important in these markets. The sequential equilibrium is not 
instantaneously attained but there is an unravelling process which describes 
how this equilibrium is approached. A majority of buyers do not initially 
assume the worst, but they lower their expectations about the common value of a 
unit after observing the quality of each unit a seller chooses to blind bid. 
As the markets unravel toward the sequential equilibrium, buyers incur losses 
on a large proportion of those items which are blind bid. However, buyers' do 
not incur significant losses on average since they also make large profits on a 
number of blind-bid items. Finally, allocations tend to be fully efficient, ex 
post, at the conclusion of each market. Even in early periods, most of the ex 
post inefficiencies which were observed could be attributed to blind bidding. 
In auctions for unique items, like the ones we have conducted, a 
sequential equilibrium will be attained if and only if all buyers adopt 
skeptical, assume-the-worst beliefs. If a single buyer is slow in adopting 
22 
this posture, the unravelling process by which a sequential equilibrium is 
attained can be seriously impeded. We have demonstrated one instance (Market 
Cl) in which the unravelling was not complete due to the presence of such a 
buyer. In all other markets, the unravelling was complete, in spite of the 
fact that this equilibrium is not robust when there is a single deviant buyer. 
To the extent that we have captured the salient features of the market 
for motion picture distribution rights, the practice of blind bidding seems to 
cause no difficulties once an equilibrium is obtained. After sufficient market 
experience, sellers only blind bid low quality items and buyers' bids indicated 
that they had adjusted their beliefs properly. Thus, if there is a case to be 
made against the practice of blind bidding from the evidence assembled here, it 
must be based on an analysis of unsatisfactory market performance while pi:ices 
and beliefs are unravelling. During this disequilibrium phase, the practice of 
blind bidding results in an increased volatility of both buyers' and sellers' 
profits and allocations which are ex post inefficient. 
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Figure 2: Common Values and Winning Bids for Blind Bid Items in Market Cl 
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Figure 3: Common Values and Winning Bids for Blind Bid Items in Market Il 
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Figure 5: Common Values and Winning Bids for Blind Bid Items in Market C2
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Figure 6: Common Values and Winning Bids for Blind Bid Items in Market 12
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ANALYSIS OF BLIND-BID ITEMS 
An entry in this table gives the number of items which were blind bid in the 
corresponding period and market. The number in parentheses indicates the 
number of blind-bid items whose common value exceeded 15 <environment \) or 
whose type was greater than 1 (environment 2). 
ENVIRONMENT I ENVIRONMENT 2 
PERIOD Al Cl II A2 C2 I2 
I 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) I (0) 1 (0) 2 (I) 
2 1 (I) 1 (1) 2 (2) 2 (2) 1 (1) I (1) 
3 0 (0) 1 ( 1) 2 (2) 1 <1) 1 (1) 1 (\) 
4 1 (1) 3 (3) 3 (3) 1 <1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 
5 0 (0) 2 (2) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
6 3 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3) 1 ( 1) 3 (3) 
7 0 (0) 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2) I (1) 2 (2) 
B 1 (0) 3 (2) 2 (1) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 
9 1 (0) 2 (I l 2 (\) 2 (0) 2 (0) 2 10) 
10 0 (0) 2 (2) 1 ( 1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 ( 1) 
11 I (0) 3 (2) 2 (1) I (0) I (0) 2 (!) 
12 1 (0) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (0) 
13 0 (0) I ( 1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) I (\) 
14 I <O> I (0) I <O> I (0) I (0) 1 (0) 
15 0 (0) I (!) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
16 0 (0) 2 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
17 2 ( 1) I (0) I (0) 0 (0) I <O> 
18 3 (2) 2 (!) I (0) 2 ( 1) 
19 2 (2) 0 (0) 0 (Q) 0 (0) 
20 1 ( 1) I (I) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
21 I (I) 0 (0) 0 <O> 0 (0) 
22 2 (!) I (0) I (0) I (0) 
X of i terns 18.BX 47. 7Y. 35.2X 26.5X 18.2X 26. IX 
blindeid ( I0.9Xl (38.6Xl (26. !Xl ( 14. 7Y.) CS.OX> < 14 .8Xl 
-
Average by 35.4X 23.4X 
environment (26.7Y.l ( 12.3Y.l 
X of items 
bl indbid 
excluding !2.5Y. 41. 7Y. IS.BY. 14.3Y. !0.4Y. 18.8% 
first 10 (0.0%) <29.2%) <6.3%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (6.3%) 
periods 
Average by 26. 7Y. 14.6% 
environment (14.2%> (2.4%) 
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TABLE 2 
CONTRADICTORY OBSERVATIONS TO THE UNRAVELLING HYPOTHESIS 
Lowest Common Value Common Value of Item 
Market Period Se! !er Previously Revealed Blind Bid This Period 
Al NONE 
Cl 5 4 76 99 
8 4 76 118 
15 4 45 63 
16 4 45 116 
Il NONE 




ESTIMATION OF EQUATION P. 0<1 + r,t + /I• 
Market N ()( l r, P-value* 
Al 12 64.76 -4.66 0.000 
(4.69) ( .60) 
Cl 42 55.4B -1.48 o.ooo 
(3.61) ( .29) 
II 31 58.65 -2.35 o.ooo 
( 1.72) ( .17) 
A2H 17 22.42 -.52 0.018 
( 1.94) ( .22) 
C2 16 36.94 -1 .47 0.000 
(3.23) ( .31) 
12 23 31. 75 -.82 0.000 
( 1.09) ( .10) 
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* These P-values are the critical probabilities for testing the hypothesis, 
H.,: r ,=O, against the one-sided alternative, H,: r,<O. 
**We dropped one observation from our analysis of this market due to a 
discrepancy in the data. This occurred in period 6, where we awarded seller 
4's item to buyer 4 at a price of $.79. While this buyer's bidding form 
confirms this action, he recorded that he had bid $.79 for seller 3's item 
and only $,05 for seller 4's item. 
Standard error of the estimate is given in parentheses. 
TABLE 4A 
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION b. O<e + r ,,,t + 11. 
ENVIRONMENT I 
Items 
Market Buyer O<e re P-value* Won 
Al 1 45.32 -2.81 0.001 6 
(4.81) ( .61) 
2 25.95 -1.58 0.025 2 
(5.61) (. 72) 
N=12 
3 44.06 -3.39 0.013 3 
( 10.11) ( 1.29) 
4 39.81 -3.08 0.001 1 
(4.53) ( .58) 
Cl 1 26.00 -1 ,61 0.001 7 
(6,01) ( .48) 
2 16.42 .45 0.999 3 
( 1.66) (.13) 
N=42 
3 41.88 -.98 0.000 3 
(3.01) ( .24) 
4 33.53 -.04 0.497 29 
(3,54) ( .28) 
11 1 35.05 -1.02 0.003 8 
(3.51) ( .35) 
2 31.14 -.57 0.047 9 
(3.29) ( .33) 
N=31 
3 26.22 -1.17 0.001 0 
(3.31) ( ,33) 
4 53.57 -2.46 o.ooo 14 
(2.80) ( .28) 
* These P-values are the critical probabilities for testing the hypothesis, 
H.,: r,,=O, against the one-sided alternative, H,: re<O. 
Standard error of the estimate is given in parentheses, 
TABLE 4B 
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION bt a2 + re t + �t 
ENVIRONMENT 2 
Items 
Market Buyer a,,. re P-value* Won 
A2 I 6.44 .78 0.999 5 
( 1.77) ( .21) 
2 8.33 .11 0.683 1 
( 1.97) ( .23) 
N=l8 
3 25.29 -1.17 0.000 10 
(2.06) ( .24) 
4** 6.75 .31 0.666 2 
(2.31) ( .27) 
C2 I 24.14 -.86 0.026 4 
(4.21) ( .41) 
2 22.05 -1.09 0.015 0 
(4.70) ( .45) 
N=16 
3 32.05 -1.38 0.000 9 
(2.20) ( .21) 
4 22.12 -.89 0.048 3 
(5.17) ( .50) 
12 I 8.59 .55 0.991 6 
(2.33) ( .21) 
2 14.94 -.51 0.019 0 
(2.48) ( .23) 
N=23 
3 26.96 -.78 0.007 7 
(3.19) ( .29) 
4 28.82 -.89 0.000 10 
( 1.73) ( .16) 
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* These P-values are the critical probabilities for testing the hypothesis, 
H,,: re=O, against the one-sided alternative, H, : re<O. 
**For buyer 4 in market A2, we used only 17 observations for the reasons given 
in Table 3. 
Standard error of the estimate is given in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5 
BUYERS' PROFITS ON BLIND-BID ITEMS 
No. of \I, of 
Blindbid Unprofitable -----Buyers' Profits-----
Market Items Purchases Range Average P-value* 
Al 12 91. 7 (-54, 2J -18.17 .003 
Cl 42 66.7 (-73,84] - 4.76 .262 
II 31 67.7 (-57,41] - 4.83 .224 
A2 18 44.4 (-51,51] - 0.17 .487 
C2 16 50.0 (-43,27] - 5.56 .098 
I2 23 43.5 (-26,14] - 4.91 .210 
* These P-values are the critical probabilities for testing the null hypothesis 
that buyers' average profits are non-negative. 
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TABLE 6 
EFF I C I ENC I ES I N  ENV I RONMENT 2 
Eff i c i ency i s  c omputed as the sum of the pr i va t e  v a l ues of the b i dders who wer e 
awarded each o f  the four i t ems d i v i de d  by the sum o f  the h i ghest p r i va t e  
v a l u es ,  f o r  t h e  four i t ems . T h e  per c en t ages i n  p ar entheses i nd i c a t e  t h e  














1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
2 1  
22 
Avg . Eff . 
per Per i o d  
Number o f  
i s a l l o c a ted 
Un f_t s
Y. of Un i t s  
i sa l l oc a ted 
nder B l i nd 
B i dd i ng 
Y. of Un i t s 
i s a l  l o c a ted M 
w hen Qua l i t y 
Reve a l ed 
A2 
. 93 ( . 9 1 ) 
. 66 ( . 67 )  
. 97 ( 1 . 00 ) 
. so ( . 97 )
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 ) 
. 78 ( 1 . 00 )  
. 62 ( . 86 )  
. 90 ( 1 . 00 ) 
. 70 ( . 93 )  
. 77 ( . 75 )  
. 98 ( 1 . 00 ) 
. 96 ( . 96 )  
. 7 4  ( 1 . 00 )  
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 ) 
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 ) 
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  
. 87 ( . 94 )  
2 1  ( 8 )  
1 3 / 1 8  
7 2 . 2% 
8 / 50 
1 6 . 0Y. 
C2 1 2  
. 65 ( . 88 )  . 9 1  ( 1 . 00 )  
. 74 ( . 78 )  . 90 ( 1 . 00 )  
. 96 ( . 97 )  . 90 ( . 97 )  
. 65 ( 1 . 00 )  1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  
. 95 ( . 95 )  . 98 ( . 98 )  
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  
. 88 ( 1 . 00 )  1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 ) 
. 72 ( 1 . 00 )  . 70 ( . 97 )  
. 90 ( 1 . 00 )  . 90 ( 1 . 00 )  
. 75 ( . 93 )  . 95 ( . 93 )  
. 98 ( . 97 )  . 75 ( . 96 )  
. 90 ( . 89 )  . B l  ( . 89 )  
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  . 96 ( 1 . 00 )  
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  . 74 ( 1 . 00 )  
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 ) 
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  . 86 ( 1 . 00 )  
1 . 00 ( 1 . 0 0 )  . 78 ( 1 . 0 0 )  
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 ) 1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  
1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  1 . 00 ( 1 . 00 )  
. 9 1  ( . 9 7 )  . 9 2  ( . 99 )  
22 ( I I  l 2 1  < B l  
1 1 / 1 6 1 3/ 2 3  
68 . 8% 56 . 5% 
1 1 /72 8/65 
1 5 . 3% 1 2 . 3X 
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APPENDIX 1 
In what follows, the titles in parentheses were not in the instructions which 
subjects received. They have been inserted so that we may conveniently 
illustrate how the two instruction sets we used differed. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
I. GENERAL. This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. 
Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. The 
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good 
decisions you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
In this experiment, we are going to conduct a market in which some of you 
will be buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of trading 
periods. Your identification is at the top of this page. It tells you whether 
you are a buyer or a seller. There are a total of 4 sellers and 4 buyers in 
the market. 
II. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO SELLERS . (IIA. MARKET INSTRUCTIONS FOR SELLERS c) 
At the beginning of each trading period you will be given one item to sell. 
Each buyer has the opportunity to enter a bid for your unit. You will receive 
a bidding form from each buyer which will indicate the amount that he/she is 
willing to pay for your unit. You must sell your item to the bidder who 
submits the highest bid and you will receive the amount that he/she bid. 
The amount which a buyer will earn if he/she purchases your unit is given 
by your unit's " resale value. " This resale value is the amount at which the 
winning bidder can resell the item to the experimenter. All bidders will have 
the same resale value for your item in a given trading period. However, this 
common resale value will not in general be the same for each of the seller's 
units in a given trading period and it will not in general be the same from 
period to period. 
In your folder you have been given a number of sealed envelopes which 
have your seller number and a trading period number on them. At the beginning 
of each trading period, you will open the envelope which corresponds to that 
period. Each env!ilope contains a slip of paper on which the buyers' resale 
value for your unit in that trading period has been written. Before buyers 
submit bids for your unit, you must come to :a decision about whether or not you 
wish to allow the buyers to see their resale value. If you agree to reveal 
your resale value before bidding starts, it will be publicly displayed to all 
market participants. 
(IIB. COMPUTING A SELLER'S PROFITS . )  At the end o f  each trading period, 
record the amount you received for your unit on your profit sheet. At the end 
of the experiment, add up the amounts you have earned in each trading period on 
your profit sheet. The experimenter will pay you this amount in cash. 
III. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO BUYERS . (IIIB. MARKET INSTRUCTIONS FOR BUYERS . )  
Remember that the amount you will earn if you purchase a unit is given by that 
unit's resale value. Each seller knows your resale value for the item he/she 
has for sale. At the beginning of each trading period you can enter bids on 
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each seller ' s  item. Before doing so , you will see whether or not each seller 
announces the resale value for the item he wishes to sell. These values , which 
are in the envelopes each seller has been given , have been determined as 
follows: In each period and for each seller' s item , the resale value has been 
chosen by random drawing. Each resale value between $. 01 and $ 1 . 25 in 
increments of 1 cent had an equally likely chance of being chosen in the 
drawing. Remember , a different drawing was held for each seller' s item and 
each period. Every time a drawing occurred , the numbers (resale values) 
$. 01, $. 02 ,  $ . 03, . . .  ' $1. 23, $ 1. 24, $ 1. 25 
each had an equally likely probability of 1/125 of being chosen. The resale 
value of one item has no effect on the resale value of any other item. 
In your folder , you will find an ample supply of bidding forms. After 
you have found out whether or not each seller announces the resale value for 
his unit , you should fill out a bidding form for each seller' s unit. On this 
form , write the trading period number , your buyer number , the number of the 
seller to whom you are sending this form , and the amount you bid for that 
seller ' s  unit. If you do not wish to bid for a particular seller' s unit , enter 
a bid of zero on the form you send to that seller. This will guarantee that 
you do not purchase that uni t .  Remember that the seller' s unit will be awarded 
to the buyer who makes the highest bid and that buyer must pay the seller tbe 
amount he/she bid , If two or more buyers submit the same highest bid , we will 
resolve this tie by a random choice of buyer . At the end of each trading 
period , we will announce: (1) the resale value of each unit , (2) which bidder 
purchased which seller' s unit ,  (3) the amount of the bid each winning bidder 
submitted. At that time you will be able to see the resale values for all 
units , including those which were not previously announced by the sellers. 
(IIIB. COMPUTING A BUYER' S PROFITS . )  In each trading period , your 
earnings are composed of two parts: base earnings and trading profits . Your 
base earnings are $. 25 in each trading period. Your trading profits are 
computed as follows: For each unit that you purchase , your trading profits on 
the purchase of that unit are given by the difference between the resale value 
of the item purchased and the amount you bid for that unit . That is , 
TRADING PROFITS FROM BUYING ONE UNIT RESALE VALUE - AMOUNT BID. 
The total earnings to each bidder are determined as follows: 
A Losing bidder earns $ . 25 in base earnings for that period. 
A Winning bidder earns $ . 25 (just like a losing bidder) plus the earnings 
from all units purchased. 
You have been given a number of BUYER' S RECORD SHEETS. Each record sheet 
corresponds to a trading period number. When you learn the resale value of a 
seller' s i tern , record that amount on line 1, corresponding to that seller' s 
identification. When you make a bid on a seller' s item , record your bid on 
line 2, corresponding to that seller' s identification. For those units for 
which you are the winning bidder , subtract line 2 from line 1 and record the 
difference on line 3. This is your trading profits from buying one unit. At 
the end of the trading period , add your trading profits from all units 
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purchased and record this total on line A. Add your base earnings (line B) to 
this amount and record this total on line C. This is your earnings for the 
trading period. 
You should keep a cumulative total of the amount you have earned during 
the experiment by adding the amount you earned tliis period on line C to the 
total amount you earned through the end of the previous period (line D) . Record 
this total on line E. This is your total earnings at the end of this period. 
At the end of the experiment , this will be the total earnings for the 
experiment .  The experiments will pay you this amount in cash . 
It is possible that a buyer might lose money on the purchase of a 
particular unit in a particular trading period. This can happen if the buyer 
wins a unit at a price (his or her bid) which is greater than the resale value 
for that unit. Because of the possibility of losses , we begin the experiment 
by giving each buyer 5 dollars. This amount is recorded on line D of your 
record sheet for trading period 1 .  
(In the second instruction set ,  section IIA. and IIIA. were replaced by the 
following. ) 
(IIA. MARKET INSTRUCTIONS FOR SELLERS . ) At the beginning of each trading 
period you will be given one item to sell. Each buyer has the opportunity to 
enter a bid for your unit. You will receive a bidding form from each buyer 
which will indicate the amount that he/she is willing to pay for your -unit. 
You must sell your item to the bidder who submits the highest bid and you will 
receive the amount that he/she bid. 
The amount which a buyer will earn if he/she purchases your unit is given 
by your unit' s "resale value. " This resale value is the amount at which the 
winning bidder can resell the item to the experimenter. All bidders will 
generally have different resale values for your item in a given trading period. 
Further , these resale values will not in general be the same from period to 
period. 
In your folder you have been given a number of sealed envelopes which 
have your seller number and a trading period number on them. At the beginning 
of each trading period , you will open the envelope which corresponds to that 
period . Each envelope contains a slip of paper on which the � of your unit 
in that trading period has been written. There are eight possible types of 
units. These are labelled I ,  II , III , IV , V ,  VI , VII , VIII. The type of a 
unit determines the range of resale values of the buyers for that unit. The 
following table
.
gives the range of the resale values for each type of unit : 
Type of Unit Range of Resale Values 
I $ . 01 - $ . 15 
II $ . 16 - $ . 30 
III $ . 3 1 - $ . 45 
IV $ . 46 - $ . 60 
v $ . 61 - $ . 75 
VI $ . 76 - $ . 90 
VII $ . 91 - $ 1. 05 
VIII $1. 06 - $ 1. 20 
Before buyers submit bids for your unit , you must come to a decision about 
whether or not you wish to allow the buyers to see your unit' s type for that 
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period . If you agree to reveal your unit ' s  type before bidding starts, it will 
be publicly displayed to all market participants . 
( IIB . MARKET INSTRUCTIONS FOR BUYERS . )  Remember that the amount you will earn 
if you purchase a unit is given your private resale value for that unit . Each 
seller knows the type of the item he/she has for sale . At the beginning of 
each trading period you enter bids on each seller ' s  item . Before doing so, you 
will see whether or not each seller announces the type of the item he wishes to 
sel l .  These types, which are in the envelopes each seller has been given, have 
been determined as follows : In each period the type of unit each seller has 
been given was determined by random drawing . Each type between l and VIII had 
an equally likely chance of being chosen in the drawing . Remember, a different 
drawing was held for each seller ' s  item and each period . Every time a drawing 
occurred, the numbers ( types) 
I, I I, I I I, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII 
each had an equally likely probability of lL!!. of being chosen . The type of one 
item chosen has no effect on the type of any other item . 
As discussed above, the type of the unit determines the range of the 
resale values you may receive for that unit . In each period, each buyer ' s  
resale value for each type of unit was chosen by a separate random drawing . 
Given the type of unit, each value in the range of resale values had an equally 
likely chance of being chosen . For example, consider type IV units . In... each 
period and for each buyer, a separate drawing occurred for that type . In each 
drawing the numbers (resale values) 
$ . 46, $ . 47, $ . 48, . . .  , $ ,58, $ . 59, $ . 60 
each had an equally likely chance of being chosen. Similarly, consider type 
VII units . In each period and for each buyer, a separate drawing occurred for 
this type . In each of these drawings, the numbers (resale values) 
$ . 91, $ . 92, $ . 93, . . . • $1 . 03, $ 1 . 04, $ 1 . 05 
each had an equally likely chance of being chosen, Remember .  in each period 
different buyers generally have different resale values for each type of unit. 
In your folder, you will find a sheet labelled YOUR RESALE VALUES . The 
columns on this sheet correspond to the type of unit and the rows correspond to 
the trading period number . This tells you your resale value for any unit that 
you may purchase during the experiment . In a given period, there may be more 
than one unit of the same type for sale . If you buy more than one unit of the 
same type in the same trading period, you will receive your resale value for 
that type for each unit that you purchase . 
In your folder, you will also find an ample supply of bidding forms . 
After you have round out whether or not each seller announces the type of his 
unit, you should fill out a bidding form for each seller ' s unit . On this form, 
write the trading period number, your buyer number, the number of the seller to 
whom you are sending this form, and the amount you bid for that seller' s unit.  
I f  you do not wish to bid for a particular seller ' s  unit, enter a bid of zero 
on the form you send to that seller . This will guarantee that you do not 
purchase that unit . Remember that the seller' s unit will be awarded to the 
buyer who makes the highes t  bid and that buyer must pay the seller the amount 
he/she bid . If two or more buyers submit the same highes t  bid, we will resolve 
this tie by a random choice of buyer. At the end of each trading period, we 
will announce: (1) the type of each unit, (2) which bidder purchased which 
seller ' s  unit, ( 3) the amount of the bid each winning bidder submitted. At 
that time you will be able to see the types of all units, including those which 
were not previously announced by the sellers . 
BUYER ' S  RECORD SHEET 
Trading Period 
l�l�·�*-T�yp,...,_,e"--"o�f'-"U�n�i�t��������������������-'-�� I 
.......___,_""""......,"-' ........ """-������������������_,_�- 1 1 2 . Resale Value 
1 1 3 . Amount Bid I 
1 4 .  Trading Profits (if you are the winning bidder subtract 
I line 3 from line 2.  if  not ,  enter U Q ll )  
1 1 . * Type of Unit .......::'--".U!.2-"-"'-"""""-"-����������������--l-� I 
1 2 . Resale Value .......__...,�._....._....., ..,_,,=-- �����������������-<-�- 1 
2 1 3 .  Amount Bid I 
1 4 .  Trading Profits (if you are the winning bidder, subtract 
I line 3 from line 2 .  if not. enter " 0 " )  
1 1. * Type of Unit ....,__;'-".....,'"-"'""'"-'""'""'""'--�����������������-'-�- 1 
1 2 . Resale Value .._,____.,"'-"-'.....,.-"-'....,.,=-- �����������������-'-�- 1 
3 1 3 . Amount Bid I 
1 4 .  Trading Profits (if you are the winning bidder, subtract 
I line 3 from line 2.  if  not .  enter " 0 " )  
1 1. * Type of Unit 
1 2 . Resale Value 
.=......;�.........,"--""'--'"-'-"" -"-�����������������4--�- ' 
......__,,=<-'._..,.'-'-'.....,,"'-- �����������������4--�- ' 
4 1 3 . Amount Bid 
1 4 .  Trading Profits (if you are the winning bidder, 
I line 3 from line 2.  if  not .  enter ll Q ll ) 
A ,  TOTAL PROFITS (add up amounts on each line 4) 
B . BASE EARNINGS 
C. EARNINGS FOR THE TRADING PERIOD (A+B) 
D . TOTAL EARNINGS AT THE END OF LAST PERIOD 
E . TOTAL EARNINGS AT THE END OF THIS PERIOD (C+D) 
subtract 
















COMMON VALUES OF ITEMS FOR SALE IN EACH PERIOD 
4 3
COMMON VALUES O F  ITEMS BY PERIOD 
12ts 
x 
1 2 0  x x x 
1 U 5 x 
1 1 0  x x x x 
1 0 1S  x 
1 0 0  x x *
ga x x 
� x x x go x x x 
83 x x 
8 0 - x x x x 
7tS x x x x x 
70 x 
Q) f U5 0 
._. x .x .... eo x p... x x 
x x x x ISIS x x x 
IS O  . 
x x x � x 
"'° x x x x 
31S x x x x 
x x x 30 x x 
x x 
2tS x x 
x 
20 x x � x 
l fl  x � x x x 1 0  x 
rs x · X x 
0 
1 2 3 4. 5 6 7 8 g 1 0  1 1  1 2  1 3  1 4  1 5  1 6  1 7  1 8  1 0  2 0  2 1  22 
P e rio d
· --- ---·· ----- --- ·--- - --· ·-- ·- ----
4S 
44 
lS 2 8 0  0 7 9  2 s 3 47 1 51 4 18 3 17 1 14 1 
APPENDIX 3 lS 3 1 1 1  0 110 2 5 4 9 9  0 
9 6  4 18 4 2 6  0 2S 2 
lS 4 6 3  1 2 6  4 6 1 18 1 46 4 19 1 1 2 2  0 121 2 
Data from Environment 1 16 1 9 5  0 94 3 6 2 2 2  1 
46 4 19 2 30 0 2 8  1 
16 2 6 1  0 60 2 6 3 8S 0 8 3  3 1 9  3 3 9  0 3 7  4 
(The co lumn labels are read as follows : "Per" is the period number ; " S e l "  is 16 3 4 7  1 2 7  4 6 4 
17 1 46 4 19 4 124 0 123 2 
the seller ' s trader number ; "Q" is the common value of the unit the seller was 16 4 116 1 
3 2  4 7 1 5 6  0 S S  4 2 0  1 2 8  1 14 2 
endowed with ; "BB" is equal to 1 if the seller chose to b l indbid the item and 17 1 S 7  0 S 7  
2 7 2 2 7  1 4S 2 2 0  2 117 0 ·116 2 
is equal to 0 otherwis e ;  " Pre" i s  the transaction price ; "Buy" is the buyer ' s 17 2 40 1 3 3  4 7 3 
7 3  0 7 2  4 2 0  3 6 2  0 6 0  2 
trader number . )  17 3 7 2  0 7 1  3 
7 4 2 7  1 46 2 2 0  4 3 6  0 3 S  1 
17 4 14 1 3 3  2 8 1 9 3  0 9 2  2 2 1  1 3 8  0 3 7  2 
Market Al 1 1  1 2S 0 24 3 4 4 6 9  1 70 4 18 1 7 9  0 7 9  4 8 2 
46 1 3 3  1 2 1  2 7 6  0 7S 4 
Per Sel Q BB Pre Buy 11 2 10 1 13 1 s 1 8 9  0 88 4 18 2 3 1 3 S  4 8 3 1 2  1 40 1 2 1  3 54 0 5 3  
4 
1 1 16 1 70 3 11 3 110 0 110 1 s 2 9 8  0 9 7  2 18 3 17 1 34 4 8 4 118 0 117 4 2 1  4 S 9  0 5 8  4 
1 2 92 0 8 7  2 11 4 3 2  0 31 1 s 3 47 1 30 1 18 4 2 6  1 3 3  2 9 1 5 3  0 5 2  2 2 2  1 1 1  1 14 2 
1 3 91 0 8 6  2 12 1 101 0 100 3 s 4 9 9  1 30 4 19 1 1 2 2  0 1 2 2  2 9 2 lS 1 3 7  1 2 2  2 5 S  0 54 1 
1 4 18 1 70 3 12 2 lOS 0 lOS 4 6 1 18 1 40 4 19 2 3 0  1 2 7  4 9 3 S7 0 S 6  
4 2 2  3 3 5  0 34 2 
2 1 20 1 4S 4 12 3 4 1 13 2 6 2 2 2  1 3S 4 19 3 3 9  1 2 7  4 9 4 1 6  1 3 1  
4 2 2  4 9 2  0 9 1  2 
2 2 76 0 7S 2 12 4 111 0 110 3 6 3 8S 0 84 1 19 4 124 0 1 2 3  1 10 1 3 1  1 2 8  
1 
2 3 9 1  0 8 9  2 13 1 5 9  0 S8 4 6 4 17 1 3S 4 20 1 2 8  1 3 6  4 10 2 3 7  0 3 6  2 
2 4 7 6  0 7 3  2 13 2 31 0 30 1 7 1 5 6  0 55 1 20 2 117 0 117 2 10 3 7 3  0 7 2  4 
3 1 90 0 8 8  4 13 3 8 3  0 83 1 7 2 2 7  1 3S 1 20 3 6 2  0 6 1  3 10 4 4S 0 44 2 
3 2 S6 0 SS 1 13 4 110 0 109 2 7 3 7 3  0 72 3 20 4 3 6  0 3 5  4 1 1  1 2S 1 2 S  2 
3 3 80 0 7 8  3 14 1 4 1 10 3 7 4 2 7  1 3(} 2 2 1  1 3 8  1 3 8  4 1 1  2 10 1 3 5  2 
3 4 3S 0 34 2 14 2 80 0 7 9  3 8 1 9 3  0 92 4 21 2 7 6  0 7 6  2 1 1  3 110 0 109 4 
4 1 9 8  0 9 8  2 14 3 120 0 119 4 8 2 46 1 30 3 21 3 54 0 5 3  3 1 1  4 3 2  0 3 1  4 
4 2 3 6  0 3 S  3 14 4 8 9  0 8 8 . 4 8 3 12 1 3S 4 21 4 5 9  0 5 8  3 1 2  1 101 0 100 1 
4 3 30 1 46 1 15 1 94 0 93 2 8 4 118 1 35 4 22 1 1 1  1 3 3  4 1 2  2 lOS 0 104 4 
4 4 6 9  0 6 9  2 15 2 80 0 7 9  4 9 1 S 3  0 52 1 2 2  2 S S  0 S S  2 12 3 4 1 2 9  1 
s 1 8 9  0 8 8  2 lS 3 111 0 110 1 9 2 1 5  1 31 1 2 2  3 3 5  1 3 3  4 12 4 111 0 110 2 
s 2 9 8  0 9 7  1 lS 4 63 0 6 3  2 9 3 5 7  0 S6 2 2 2  4 9 2  0 9 1  1 13 1 5 9  0 S 8  2 
s 3 47 0 46 3 16 1 9S 0 94 1 9 4 1 6  1 3S 3 13 2 3 1  0 3 0  1 
s 4 9 9  0 9 8  2 16 2 61 0 60 3 10 1 3 1  1 3 5  4 Market I l  13 3 8 3  0 8 2  4 
6 1 18 1 3 6  1 16 3 47 0 46 1 10 2 3 7  1 39 4 Per Sel Q B B  P r e  Buy 13 4 110 0 108 1 
6 2 2 2  1 42 1 16 4 116 0 llS 2 10 3 7 3  0 72 4 1 1 1 6  1 5 1  4 14 1 4 1 2 1  4 
6 3 8S 0 8S 2 10 4 45 0 44 1 1 2 9 2  1 S l  4 14 2 80 0 7 9  4 
6 4 17 1 2 9  1 Market C l  1 1  1 2S 1 40 4 1 3 9 1  1 6 1  4 14 3 120 0 118 4 
7 1 56 0 55 1 Per Sel Q BB Pre Buy 1 1  2 10 1 36 4 1 4 1 8  1 7 5  4 14 4 8 9  0 8 8  2 
7 2 27 0 2 6  1 1 1 16 1 73 1 1 1  3 1 1 0  0 109 2 2 1 2 0  1 5 8  1 lS 1 9 4  0 9 2  2 
7 3 7 3  0 . 7 3 2 1 2 9 2  0 88 1 1 1  4 3 2  1 31 1 2 2 7 6  1 so 2 1 5  2 80 0 7 9  4 
7 4 27 0 -26 3 1 3 9 1  1 71 1 12 1 101 0 100 4 2 3 9 1  0 8 5  2 lS 3 1 1 1  0 110 2 
8 1 9 3  0 9 2  3 1 4 18 1 91 1 12 2 lOS 0 104 2 2 4 7 6  0 7 0  2 15 4 6 3  0 6 2  2 
8 2 46 0 45 3 2 1 20 1 65 3 12 3 4 1 30 4 
8 3 12 1 17 1 2 2 7 6  0 74 3 12 4 1 1 1  0 110 3 
3 1 90 0 8 6  4 16 1 9 S  0 9 3  2 
8 4 118 0 117 1 2 3 91 0 89 3 13 1 S 9  0 58 4 
3 2 S 6  0 5 0  2 16 2 6 1  0 6 0  4 
9 1 S3 0 S3 2 2 4 7 6  0 74 3 13 2 3 1  1 40 4 
3 3 8 0  1 50 1 16 3 47 0 46 2 
9 2 15 1 13 2 3 1 90 0 8 9  3 13 3 8 3  0 82 3 
3 4 3 5  1 4 1  4 16 4 116 0 114 2 
9 3 S7 0 S6 2 3 2 S 6  0 SS 4 13 4 110 0 109 1 
4 1 9 8  0 9 6  3 17 1 5 7  0 5 5  1 
9 4 16 0 16 2 3 3 80 0 7 9  3 14 1 4 1 26 4 
4 2 3 6  1 5 1  4 17 2 40 0 3 9  2 
10 1 31 0 30 1 3 4 3 5  1 6S 4 14 2 80 0 79 3 
4 3 3 0  1 S l  4 17 3 7 2  0 7 1  2 
10 2 37 0 3 6  2 4 1 9 8  0 97 3 14 3 120 0 119 4 
4 4 6 9  1 S l  4 17 4 14 1 20 2 
10 3 7 3  0 7 3  2 4 2 3 6  1 so 4 14 4 8 9  0 88 3 s 1 8 9  0 
8 7  4 18 1 7 9  0 7 7  3 
10 4 45 0 44 3 4 3 30 1 so 4 1 5  1 94 0 94 2 5 2 9 8  0 
9 S  2 18 2 3 1 20 2 
46 
Data from Environment 2 
(The column labels are read as follows : " Per" is the period number ; 11 Sel11 is
the seller ' s  trader number ; "Typ" is the type of unit the seller was endowed 
with; "BB" is equal to 1 if the seller chose to blindbid the item and is equal 
to 0 otherwise ; " Prc0 is the transaction price ; " Buy" is the buyer ' s  trader 
number ; " Rl " - "R4" are the resale values for the corresponding type of unit for 
buyers 1 - 4 ,  respectively . Recall that the common value of a unit ,  q ,  is given 
by q - 15 (type - 1) + 1 . ) 
Market A2 11 1 2 0 26 4 18 26 19 29 
Per Sel Typ BB Pre Buy Rl R2 R3 R4 11 2 1 1 15 2 8 11 13 2 
0 115 2 118 120 120 119 1 1 1 1 30 3 2 7 14 12 11 3 8 
1 2 6 0 80 3 76 80 86 78 11 4 3 0 40 1 31 40 37 40 
1 3 6 0 80 3 76 80 86 78 12 1 7 0 100 1 104 102 102 101 
1 4 2 0 20 4 16 29 25 26 12 2 7 0 100 1 104 102 102 101 
2 1 2 1 24 3 30 22 29 25 12 3 1 1 20 1 10 1 6 11 
2 2 5 0 69 3 66 73 65 69 12 4 8 0 113 4 107 116 112 118 
2 3 6 0 80 1 88 81 81 77 13 1 4 0 56 3 53 46 60 46 
2 4 5 1 14 3 66 73 65 69 13 2 2 0 25 1 25 26 22 27 
3 1 6 0 83 4 84 81 78 88 13 3 6 0 85 2 87 90* 76 85 
3 2 4 1 24 3 58 56 57 57 13 4 8 0 116 4 114 107 115 120 
3 3 6 0 83 4 84 81 78 88 14 1 1 1 15 1 1 7 - 1 12 
3 4 3 0 40 2 43 44 41 40 14 2 6 0 87 1 87 80 86 85 
4 1 7 0 100 1 104 96 93 92 14 3 8 0 114 3 114 114 116 115 
4 2 3 0 40 1 44 42 37 45 14 4 6 0 87 1 87 80 86 85 
4 3 2 1 18 3 17 17 18 27 15 1 6 0 85 4 82 76 81 88 
4 4 5 0 69 3 70 63 72 62 15 2 6 0 85 4 82 76 81 88 
5 1 6 0 83 4 79 84 87 88 15 3 8 0 115 4 114 113 112 118 
5 2 7 0 100 2 93 103 94 103 15 4 4 0 56 2 55 59 53 54 
5 3 3 0 37 2 36 37 34 37 16 1 7 0 100 2 92 104 93 100 
5 4 7 0 100 2 93 103 94 103 16 2 4 0 55 2 51 59* 53 49 
6 1 2 1 18 3 16 20 28 28 16 3 3 0 39 4 38 38 36 42 
6 2 2 1 12 3 16 20 28 28 16 4 8 0 116 3 115 111 118 111 
6 3 6 0 84 2 85 89 84 7 9  17 1 4 0 54 4 54 52 47 58 
6 4 2 1 79 4 16 20 28 28 17 2 3 0 42 3 44 43 44 41 
7 1 4 0 54 3 54 58 59 55 17 3 5 0 70 2 61 71 67 68 
7 2 2 1 18 3 23 28 24 29 17 4 1 1 15 1 15 11 8 7 
7 3 5 0 66 2 61 73 68 71 
7 4 2 1 20 � 1 23 28 24 29 Market C2 
8 1 6 0 80 2 83 84 76 80 Per Sel Typ BB Pre Buy Rl R2 R3 R4 
8 2 3 0 40 3 43 31 45 45 1 1 1 1 45 1 2 7 14 12 
8 3 1 1 20 1 1 7 15 13 1 2 6 0 80 3 76 80 86 78 
8 4 8 0 110 4 120 114 107 115 1 3 6 0 79 3 76 80 86 78 
9 1 4 0 50 2 51 54 48 51 1 4 2 0 21 3 16 29 25 26 
9 2 1 1 18 3 1 10 11 13 2 1 2 1 50 4 30 22 29 25 
9 3 4 0 50 2 51 54 48 51 2 2 5 0 65 4 66 73 65 69 
9 4 1 1 20 3 1 10 11 13 2 3 6 0 83 1 88 81 81 77 
10 1 2 1 14 4 27 19 19 17 2 4 5 0 65 4 66 73 65 69 
10 2 3 0 35 3 35 39 38 33 3 1 6 0 85 4 84 81 78 88 
10 3 5 0 70 3 66 67 74 70 3 2 4 1 30 3 58 56 57 57 
10 4 3 0 3 5  3 35 39 38 33 3 3 6 0 85 4 84 81 78 88 
47 
3 4 3 0 40 1 43 44 41 40 16 4 8 0 116 3 115 111 118 
111 
4 1 7 0 100 1 104 96 93 92 17 1 4 0 57 4 54 52 47
 58 
4 2 3 1 25 3 44 42 37 45 17 2 3 0 42 3 44 43 44 41 
4 3 2 1 25 3 17 17 18 27 17 3 5 0 70 1 61 71* 67 
68 
4 4 5 0 70 3 70 63 72 62 17 4 1 0 12 1 15 11 8 7 
5 1 6 0 85 3 79 84 87 88 18 1 6 0 86 4 76 81 7
9 88 
5 2 7 0 100 4 93 103 94 103 18 2 1 1 13 3 8 2 13 
6 
5 3 3 0 35 1 36 37 34 37 18 3 2 0 25 2 22 27 
16 19 
5 4 7 0 100 4 93 103 94 103 18 4 2 0 25 2 22 27 16 19 
6 1 2 0 25 4 16 20 28 28 19 1 8 0 116 4 115 111 111 117 
6 2 2 1 25 3 16 20 28 28 19 2 2 0 27 4 25 24 26 30 
6 3 6 0 85 2 85 89 84 79 19 3 3 0 36 4 32 36 34 37 
6 4 2 0 25 3 16 20 28 28 19 4 8 0 116 4 115 111 111 117 
7 1 4 0 55 3 54 58 59 55 20 1 2 0 26 3 19 22 28 21 
7 2 2 0 26 4 23 28 24 29 20 2 8 0 112 2 113 115 107 108 
7 3 5 0 70 2 61 73 68 71 20 3 4 0 51 3 49 47 52 46 
7 4 2 1 23 1 23 28 24 29 20 4 3 0 41 1 43 31 40 34 
8 1 6 0 81 2 83 84 76 80 21 1 3 0 42 4 32 36 36 43 
8 2 3 0 43 4 43 31 45 45 21 2 5 0 71 2 70 75 62 67 
8 3 1 1 25 1 1 7 15 13 21 3 4 0 5 5  1 57 50 53 49 
8 4 8 0 115 1 120 114 107 115 21 4 4 0 5 5  1 57 50 53 49 
9 1 4 0 51 2 51 54 48 51 22 1 1 1 14 4 9 5 5 15 
9 2 1 1 26 3 1 10 11 13 22 2 4 0 57 3 56 57 59 57 
9 3 4 0 51 2 51 54 48 51 22 3 3 0 40 3 39 42 42 32 
9 4 1 1 26 3 1 10 11 13 22 4 6 0 82 2 83 85 80 78 
10 1 2 1 15 3 27 19 19 17 
10 2 3 0 36 3 35 39 38 33 Market 12 
10 3 5 0 70 3 66 67 74 70 Per Sel Typ BB Pre Buy Rl R2 R3 R4 
10 4 3 0 36 3 35 39 38 33 1 1 1 1 40 3 2 7 14 12 
11 1 2 0 26 4 18 26 19 29 1 2 6 0 83 3 76 80 86 78 
11 2 1 1 15 3 8 11 13 2 1 3 6 0 84 3 76 80 86 78 
11 3 8 0 117 4 118 120 120 119 1 4 2 1 31 3 16 29 25 26 
11 4 3 0 39 4 31 40 37 40 2 1 2 1 25 4 30 22 29 25 
12 1 7 0 101 2 104 102 102 101 2 2 5 0 70 2 66 73 65 69 
12 2 7 0 101 2 104 102 102 101 2 3 6 0 84 1 88 81 81 77 
12 3 1 1 15 1 10 1 6 11 2 4 5 0 70 2 66 7 3  65 69 
12 4 8 0 116 4 107 116 112 118 3 1 6 0 83 4 84 81 78 88 
13 1 4 0 57 3 53 46 60 46 3 2 4 0 55 4 58 56 57 57 
13 2 2 0 26 4 - 25 26 22 27 3 3 6 0 85 4 84 81 78 88 
13 3 6 0 85 1 -87 79 76 85 3 4 3 1 26 4 43 44 41 40 
13 4 8 0 118 4 114 107 115 120 4 1 7 0 99 1 104 96 93 92 
14 1 1 1 12 4 1 7 1 12 4 2 3 0 40 4 44 42 37 45 
14 2 6 0 85 1 87 80 86 85 4 3 2 1 26 4 17 17 18 27 
14 3 8 0 115 3 114 114 116 115 4 4 5 0 70 3 70 63 72 62 
14 4 6 0 85 1 87 80 86 85 5 1 6 0 84 4 79 84 87 88 
15 1 6 0 87 4 82 76 81 88 5 2 7 0 100 2 93 103 94 103 
15 2 6 0 87 4 82 76 81 88 5 3 3 0 35 1 36 37 34 37 
15 3 8 0 117 4 114 113 112 118 5 4 7 0 100 2 93 103 94 103 
15 4 4 0 56 2 55 59 53 54 6 1 2 1 27 3 16 20 28 28 
16 1 7 0 100 2 92 104 93 100 6 2 2 1 27 4 16 20 28 28 
16 2 4 0 52 3 51 49 53 49 6 3 6 0 85 2 85 89 84 79 
16 3 3 0 40 4 38 38 36 42 6 4 2 1 28 4 16 20 28 28 
48 
7 1 4 0 5 6  3 54 58 5 9  5 5  2 0  1 2 0 2 5  3 19 22 28 21 
7 2 2 1 2 5  4 23 28 24 2 9  20 2 8 0 113 2 113 115 107 108 
7 3 5 0 70 2 61 73 68 71 20 3 4 0 5 1  3 49 47 52 46 
7 4 2 1 2 6  4 2 3  28 24 2 9  2 0  4 3 0 40 1 43 31 40 34 
8 1 6 0 8 2  1 8 3  8 4  7 6  80 21 1 3 0 40 4 3 2  3 6  3 6  43 
8 2 3 0 41 3 43 31 45 45 21 2 5 0 7 3  2 70 7 5  62 67 
8 3 1 1 2 6  1 1 7 1 5  13 21 3 4 0 5 6  1 5 7  50 5 3  4 9  
8 4 8 0 1 1 5  1 120 114 107 115 21 4 4 0 5 6  1 5 7  50 53 49 
9 1 4 0 5 1  2 5 1  5 4  48 5 1  2 2  1 1 1 12 4 9 5 5 15 
9 2 1 1 24 3 1 10 1 1  13 22 2 4 0 SS 3 S6 S7 S9 S7 
9 3 4 0 S 2  2 S l  S4 48 5 1  2 2  3 3 0 40 3 3 9  42 42 32 
9 4 1 1 24 3 1 10 1 1  1 3  22 4 6 0 8 3  2 8 3  8 5  8 0  78 
10 1 2 1 2 2  1 2 7  1 9  1 9  17 
10 2 3 0 3 7  3 3 5  39 38 3 3  * In three instances a buyer misrecorded 
10 3 s 0 70 3 6 6  6 7  7 4  7 0  h i s  resale value . This occured in Market 
10 4 3 0 3 7  3 3S 39 38 3 3  A 2  when buyer 2 recorded his valuation 
11 1 2 1 24 4 18 26 19 29 for a type 6 item in period 13 as 90 when 
11 2 1 1 24 4 8 11 13 2 it should have been 79 and in period 16 , 
1 1  3 8 0 l l S  4 118 120 1 2 0  1 1 9  when the same buyer misrecorded h i s  
11 4 3 0 40 4 3 1  40 3 7  40 valuation for s type 6 item as S9 instead 
12 1 7 0 102 2 104 102 102 101 o f  49 . The third instance occurred in 
12 2 7 0 102 2 104 102 102 101 Market C2 . In period 17 , buyer 1 
12 3 1 1 20 3 10 1 6 1 1  recorded h i s  valuation as 7 2  when i t  
1 2  4 8 0 115 4 107 116 112 118 should have been 6 1 . In these three 
13 1 4 0 SS 3 S 3  4 6  6 0  4 6  cases , w e  u s e  the recorded value instead 
13 2 2 1 19 1 2 5  2 6  2 2  27 of the actual resale value when we 
13 3 6 0 8 5  1 8 7  7 9  7 6  8S analyze the data . 
13 4 8 0 115 4 114 107 l l S  120 
14 1 1 1 20 1 1 7 1 12 
14 2 6 0 8 6  1 8 7  80 8 6  8S 
14 3 8 0 114 3 114 114 116 llS 
14 4 6 0 8 6  1 8 7  80 8 6  8 S  
lS 1 6 0 8 S  4 8 2  7 6  8 1  8 8  
l S  2 6 0 8S 4 8 2  7 6  8 1  88 
lS 3 8 0 115 4 114 113 112 118 
15 4 4 0 S 7  2 SS S9 S3 S4 
16 1 7 0 102 2 92 104 93 100 
16 2 4 0 S2 3 S l  4 9  S 3  49 
16 3 3 0 40 4 3 8  3 8  3 6  42 
16 4 8 0 114 - 3 llS 111 118 111 
17 1 4 0 S4 4 S4 S2 47 S8 
17 2 3 0 4 1  1 44 43 44 41 
17 3 5 0 6 9  2 6 1  7 1  6 7  6 8  
1 7  4 1 1 20 3 lS 11 8 7 
18 1 6 0 84 4 7 6  8 1  7 9  8 8  
18 2 1 1 18 1 8 2 1 3  6 
18 3 2 1 18 1 2 2  27 16 19 
18 4 2 0 2S 2 2 2  2 7  1 6  19 
19 1 8 0 114 4 llS 111 111 117 
19 2 2 0 2S 4 2 5  2 4  2 6  3 0  
1 9  3 3 0 3 7  4 3 2  36 34 37 
19 4 8 0 llS 4 l l S  111 1 1 1  117 
